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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
REINSTATEMENT OF SIT-DOWN STRIKERS
By GEORGE B. WEISIGER*
IN July, 1938, the United States court of appeals for the
seventh circuit decided a case1 of unusual social significance.
The controversy grew out of a sit-down strike continuing from
February 17 to February 26, 1937, in the plant of the Fansteel
Metallurgical Corporation at Waukegan, Illinois. On February
17, a committee of Local 66 of the Amalgamated Association of
Iron, Steel and Tin Workers of America called on the Fansteel
superintendent and requested recognition of their Union. Upon
the refusal of this request, the committee held a secret meeting.
after which about one hundred men seized two key buildings of
the plant. Foremen and other employees of the plant were re-
quested to leave. The buildings were locked and barricaded from
the inside, resulting in a complete stoppage of the operations of
the entire plant. A few hours after the plant was seized, the
company's superintendent, with its counsel and two police officers.
asked for admission to the buildings and the surrender of pos-
session. When the occupants refused to comply, the counsel
announced that all the men remaining in the buildings were dis-
charged for the violent seizure and retention of the buildings.
A mandatory injunction was issued by the circuit court of
Lake County, directing the occupants to vacate the buildings and
return possession to the owner. When this order was read to the
strikers, they refused to comply. The court then issued a writ
of attachment for the sit-downers to show cause why they should
not be held in contempt of court. The sheriff and about one
hundred deputies, in attempting to serve this writ, were driven
away with streams of fire extinguishing chemicals, and were bom-
barded from the upper floors with steel missiles and quantities of
sulphuric acid. On February 26, the officers finally evicted the
strikers with the use of tear and emetic gases. Thirty-seven of the
men who seized the buildings were arrested and sentenced to fine
and imprisonment for contempt. 2 No serious damage to the
machinery was shown, but most of the windows of the buildings
*Professor of Law, University of Illinois.
'Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board,
(C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1938) 98 F. (2d) 375.2The sentence of the circuit court was affirmed by the Appellate Court
of Illinois on May 10, 1938. 295 Ill. App. 323; 14 N. E. (2d) 991.
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were broken, and a number of small tools lost and many inventory
items rendered useless by being dropped from the windows. When
the plant resumed operation, twenty-three of those evicted by the
officers were reemployed upon their application. Sixty-one of
the men who returned to work were members of Lodge 66, and
were reinstated without any condition as to Union membership.
Some time in April the employees of the Fansteel Company or-
ganized Local No. 1 of the Rare Metal Workers of America upon
the suggestion of the corporation, although it did not directly
participate in the organization or management. The first meeting
was held in the company's building, and use was made of the
company's mimeograph machine in printing ballots.
In May, 1937, the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel
and Tin Workers of America filed an amended charge before the
National Labor Relations Board, setting forth unfair labor prac-
tices of the Fansteel Company. The board issued its complaint,
and set a hearing in June. The board found: that the company
had employed a spy to engage in espionage within the Union;
that on February 17 and at all times thereafter, a majority of the
employees of the appropriate unit had designated Lodge 66 of the
Amalgamated Union as their bargaining representative; that a
sit-down strike was engaged in, and although the strikers resorted
to violence in resisting arrest, no sabotage of equipment occurred.
The board also found: that while the employer announced at the
beginning of the sit-down strike that the occupants of the build-
ings were discharged, this in fact did not constitute a discharge,
and that they at all times remained employees; that in March the
company refused to bargain collectively with the Union, and sent
agents to certain employees who had engaged in the seizure of the
buildings to induce them to return to work; and that the company
had dominated the organization and administration of Rare Metal
Workers of America, Local No. 1. The board also found that
none of the employees had been discharged for Union activity,
and that the attempted discharge of the men for seizing the com-
pany's buildings was not discriminatory. Since the board found
that at the time the plant was seized Lodge 66 had in its member-
ship a majority of the employees, the company was ordered to
recognize and bargain collectively with this Union, notwithstand-
ing .the fact that some who returned to work had abandoned the
Lodge. The board declined to order back pay for the sit-down
strikers, since there was no discriminatory discharge and no ap-
plications for reinstatement had been made by them. The board
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ordered reinstatement of all who went on strike on February
17, regardless of their conduct. This order included the thirty-
seven men who were convicted and sentenced in the state court.
The company petitioned the United States circuit court of ap-
peals for a review of the board's order.
The court set aside the board's order in a two-to-one decision.
It held that there was substantial evidence to support the board's
finding that the company had engaged in espionage within the
Amalgamated Workers' Union, and that the evidence supported
the finding that the company had contributed support to the or-
ganization of the Rare Metal Workers' organization. The court
held erroneous the board's finding that the company had refused
to bargain collectively with representatives of employees as re-
quired by section 8(5) of the Labor Act.3 This holding was
based on the legality of the discharge of the sit-down strikers.
After the strike and resumption of operations at the plant, Lodge
66 no longer had a majority of the employees if discharge of those
who seized the buildings was valid. The board's contention was
that the men were not discharged, and from the standpoint of
bargaining they were still employees, and the company was bound
to reinstate them. The board contended before the court that
the re-employment of some of the strikers who, the company be-
lieved, had been coerced to take part in the sit-down, indicated
that there never was an intention to discharge any of them. Fur-
thermore, it was contended the men did not think the announce-
ment of the company was intended as a discharge. The court
denied the validity of this argument, and held the men were dis-
charged for cause, and that they could not be counted as employees
for determining a bargaining representative.
In support of its order for reinstatement of the sit-down strik-
ers, the Labor Board contended that it had found that the men were
not engaged in sabotage, and that no malicious sabotage of equip-
ment occurred. The court set aside these findings as not being sup-
ported by substantial evidence. The court held that the contrary
3National Labor Relations Act. U. S. Code, title 29, sections 151-166.
Sec. 8(5) of the Act provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees subject to the provisions of section 9(a)."
Section 9(a) provides: "Representatives designated or selected for the
purpose of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit
appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all
the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective barg..unin, in
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of
employment."
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was established by undisputed evidence, and that while there was
no serious damage to the machinery, other equipment of the plant
was subject to sabotage as well as the machines. The court,
however, regarded the matter of sabotage as not decisive of the
case. In other words, whether or not sabotage existed, there was
still, on account of the sit-down strike and the refusal of the
employees to surrender possession, just cause for the discharge
of the employees. In support of this holding, Judge Sparks in
the majority opinion said :-
"With respect to the board's findings and conclusions relating
to petitioner's violation of section 8(5) we are unable to concur,
because some of the facts upon which the conclusions are said to
be based are not only not supported by substantial evidence, but
the contrary is undenied. The difference of opinion in this respect
arises over the questions whether petitioner had good cause to
discharge the sit-down strikers on February 17, and, if so, did the
petitioner at that time discharge them? There seems to be no
denial by the board that there was ample cause for discharge.
Indeed, in the argument before this court the board admitted that
the men in conducting a sit-down strike and resisting the officers
'did a foolish and illegal act.' Certainly it cannot be denied that
an employer is warranted in discharging his employees, and sever-
ing that relationship, when they take and retain exclusive posses-
sion of his property against his will. They had a complete and
adequate remedy, without cost to them, at the hands of the board,
by the use of which they would have lost nothing in time or
wagfes, if their cause were just. The employer had no coordinate
right in this respect. The employees, however, spurned this legal
remedy, disregarding all law on this subject and essayed to settle
the difficulty according to their own sense of right and justice,
and contrary to the better thought of those who really have at
heart the best interests of all laborers. In this they violated the
law which they now seek to enforce against petitioner. We are
convinced that petitioner was warranted in discharging the em-
ployees, and we are compelled to so hold in order to avoid placing
our approval upon such activities as they engaged in. To do
otherwise, would be an injustice not only to the employer, but to the
unions and their friends who wish them well."
Judge Lindley in a concurring opinion said :5
"The discharge was justified and the employer was not there-
after under any obligation and sustained no relationship to the
discharged men. They were no longer employees; consequently
the board's order being based erroneously (in part) upon a
contrary premise, must be vacated."
4(C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1938) 98 F. (2d) 375, 380.
5(C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1938) 98 F. (2d) 375, 382.
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In a dissenting opinion Judge Treanor said :"
"My disagreement with the reasoning and result of the majority
decision rests upon a difference of opinion as to the respective
powers of the National Labor Relations Board and this court in
the determination of the legal consequences to be attached to the
unlawful acts of striking employees. It is, in short, my under-
standing of the National Labor Relations Act that when employees
have ceased work in connection with a labor dispute or because
of an unfair labor practice, the employer-employee relationship
continues by force of law; and that although unlawful conduct
by striking employees is a fact which must be considered by the
board in determining the scope of its order, such order cannot be
set aside by this court unless the making of the order constitutes
an abuse of discretion by the Board in view of all pertinent facts,
including the fact of misconduct of the employees."
The substance of the decision was that the National Labor
Relations Act imposed no duty on the Fansteel Company to rein-
state as employees the men whom it discharged for engaging in
the sit-down strike. Inasmuch as these strikers lost their status
as employees by the discharge, Lodge 66 of the Amalgamated
Union, not constituting a majority of the Fansteel workers. was
not a legally chosen representative for bargaining purposes and
the company did not violate section 8(5) of the Act which pro-
vides:
"It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse
to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employee.
subject to the provisions of section 9(a)."
The text of section 9(a) is as follows:
"Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of
collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit
appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives
of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective
bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment,
or other conditions of employment; Provided, That any individual
employee or group of employees shall have the right at any time
to present grievances to their employer."
It should be noted, however, that the court upheld the board's
findings that the company had violated the Labor Act, section
8(1), 8(2), by engaging in espionage and by contributing support
to the organization of Rare Mletal Workers of America, Local
No. 1.7
6(C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1938) 98 F. (2d) 375, 383.
7National Labor Relations Act, section 7. "Employees shall have the
right to self organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
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Thus the validity of the discharge of the strikers was the im-
portant issue before the court. If the employer-employee rela-
tionship was terminated, then the Labor Board had no more
authority to demand their reinstatement than it would have to
demand the employment of any group of men whose names it
might submit to the company. The contention of the board that
there was no discharge in fact for lack of intention on the part
of the company to dismiss the strikers deserves little attention,
and is satisfactorily answered by the court. The statement of
judge Treanor in his dissent is of more substance. His under-
standing of the National Labor Relations Act was that when men
cease work in connection with a labor dispute or because of an
unfair labor practice, the employer-employee relationship con-
tinues by force of law. Does this mean that regardless of the
nature of an employee's unlawful conduct after a strike begins,
the employer-employee relationship must continue? The dissent
goes on to say that the unlawful acts are facts to be considered
by the board in making its order, but the court should not set
aside the order in the absence of abuse of discretion by the board.
Generally at common law an employer was privileged to dis-
charge employees. Likewise, employees could quit work when
they desired, and under most conditions were entitled to strike.
But under the National Labor Relations Board, since the main
objective is compulsory collective bargaining, if an employer could
discharge employees for ceasing work whenever a dispute arose,
or for engaging in some labor activity, and could employ others
in their stead, there would be little substance left in the Act. The
board has issued many orders requiring reinstatement of workers,
and frequently this has been coupled with a requirement for back
pay or compensation for the employees during the period of the
dispute.
The National Labor Relations Act, section 2(3) provides:
"The term 'employee' shall include any employee, and shall
not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless
engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection."
Section 8. "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-(1) To interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in section 7.
(2) To dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of
any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it;
Provided, That subject to rules and regulations made and published by the
Board pursuant to section 6 (a), an employer shall not be prohibited from
permitting employees to confer with him during working hours without
loss of time or pay."
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the Act explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any individual
whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with,
any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice,
and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially
equivalent employment ... "
In view of this section, it is pertinent to inquire whether the men
whose reinstatement the board ordered ceased working for the
company "in connection with a current labor dispute," or on ac-
count of a lawful discharge by the employer for their unlawful
conduct. It is believed that the second ground is the true basis
for the cessation of their work. It seems unreasonable to inter-
pret this section so as to prevent an employer from discharging
an employee regardless of how outrageous the employee's con-
duct may be, merely because at the time he is engaged in a strike.
The employee's attempt to burn the employer's factory would
certainly be ground for discharge. The opposite view should
make this section void on constitutional grounds.
The findings of the Labor Board may here be considered
with reference to whether a sit-down strike is recognized as in-
cluded in the expression "as a consequence of, or in connection
with any current labor dispute." The board found that the dis-
charge was not discriminatory. Section 8(3) of the Act provides:
"It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer by dis-
crimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization.
If the board had recognized the sit-down strike as a legitimate
method of collective bargaining, it is difficult to understand why
the discharge was not discriminatory. Suppose a committee of
the Amalgamated Union Lodge 66 had been discharged imme-
diately upon asking recognition of their organization. It seems
clear this discharge would amount to discrimination, under sec-
tion 8(3) in regard to tenure, as discouraging membership in a
labor organization. Or if a few employees were discharged for
holding a meeting to discuss plans for organizing all the em-
ployee§, this also would appear to be discrimination, and their
reinstatement would be ordered with back pay. But when the
employees were discharged for seizing the employer's property
and shutting down the plant, this, by finding of the board, was
not discriminatory.
In this connection, the language of section 7 may again be
considered:
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"Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted
activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection."
And section 8(1) makes it an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer:
"To interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exer-
cise of the rights guaranteed in section 7."
Now a sit-down strike is a concerted activity, and it was engaged
in for the purpose of collective bargaining. 'And clearly, the em-
ployer interfered with it by driving out the strikers by throwing
tear gas into the building. It even restrained it by help of the
court, and went to the extent of having some of the sit-down
strikers fined and imprisoned for contempt. If the Labor Board
had regarded the sit-down strike performance as one in respect
to which the Act protected the strikers, it would seem that a
complaint for violating section 8 (1) should have been made for
interfering with "a concerted activity engaged in for the purpose
(if collective bargaining." If a sit-down strike is not legalized
by the language of section 7, neither should it be by the language
of section 2(3). The employees' work did not cease "as a conse-
quence of, or in connection with any current labor dispute or be-
cause of any unfair labor practice," but by discharge for unlaw-
ful conduct.'
The dissenting opinion denied the power of the court to set
aside the order of the board unless the making of the order con-
stituted an abuse of discretion by the Board in view of all the
pertinent facts. Section 10(f) of the Act provides that when a
final order of the Labor Board is reviewed by the circuit court
of appeals the findings of the board as to the facts, if supported
by evidence, shall be conclusive. The question arises as to what
is meant by facts in this provision.
The board can exercise only such powers as are conferred
upon it by the Act. Its jurisdiction to hear and determine cases
is determined by the provisions of the statute. Suppose an em-
ployer dismissed one of his men who followed a practice of appro-
priating the property of other employees to his personal use, and
8in National Labor Relations Board v. Mackay Radio and Telegraph
Co., (1938) 50 Sup. Ct. 904, it was held that the employer-employee rela-
tionship continued under sec. 2(3) but the Supreme Court sustained a
finding by the Board that the Mackay Co. was guilty of discrimination in
refusing to reinstate some of the employees.
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there was evidence that the man discharged was active as an
organizer of a labor union that was seeking a collective bargaining
agreement with the employer. Would the board's finding of dis-
crimination be conclusive? Or would the court determine whether
there was substantial evidence of a discharge for union activity?
If the court found the discharge was for theft, would not the
board's order for reinstatement on the ground of discrimination
be in excess of its authority? In the case at hand, in determining
whether the employer-employee relationship continued, the ques-
tion is whether the men ceased work as a consequence of or in
connection with a labor dispute. If they did, then, by the terms
of the Act, they were still employees. If their work ceased as a
result of their valid dismissal on another ground not included in
the Act, then the board was without authority to order their rein-
statement. If the board had the power if supported by evidence
to make a conclusive finding that the men continued as employees,
it would, it seems, have the same power to find that a sit-down
strike is "a concerted activity for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining.""
In setting aside the board's order the court said:
"With respect to the board's findings and conclusions relating
to petitioner's violation of section 8(5) we are unable to concur,
because some of the facts upon which the conclusions are said to
be based are not only not supported by substantial evidence, but
the contrary is undenied."
With respect to the facts there was really no dispute. On the
basis of these facts the board's conclusion was that the strikers
continued to be employees. The court's conclusion was that the
employment of these men bad ended. This is a conclusion of
law with respect to what the statute means, and is not a finding
of fact. The court decided that with reference to the Act the
strikers' work had ceased, not in connection with a current labor
dispute, but by a valid discharge. With reference to the powers
of the board as defined by the statute, it had acted beyond its
authority. It is submitted that in construing the statute with
respect to the jurisdiction of the board the court is not bound
by the board's conclusions. 0 Otherwise there would be little
reason for a review at all.
A similar problem arises under the workmen's compensation
9See sections 7 and 8(1) in note 7, supra.
'*See Crowell v. Benson, (1931) 285 U. S. 22, 52 Sup. Ct. 285, 76 L. Ed.
598; Rosenberry, Power of Courts to Set Aside Administrative Rules and
Orders, (1938) 24 A. B. A. J. 279.
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laws. The industrial board is given authority to make awards for
accidents "arising out of and in the course of employment." Many
awards of the boards have been set aside by the courts because
the accident did not "arise out of the employment" or did not
occur "in the course of employment." In these cases the boards
have acted outside of their jurisdiction as defined by the law. The
courts interpret these phrases, "arising out of employment" and
"in the course of employment," in a way that is reasonable with
respect to the risk that should be put upon an employer. The
point is that the courts and not the boards have the final word as
to the meaning of these phrases under the workmen's compensa-
tion statutes."'
It may be contended, however, that the Fansteel Case is of
such social significance that the rights of the strikers should not
be confined by any strict construction of the Act under which
they sought relief, or by any legalistic reasoning as to the inter-
pretation of the Act. The position taken by the board before the
court in support of its order appeared to be based in part on the
ground that since the company had been guilty of espionage and of
fostering a company union, the unlawful conduct of the sit-down
strikers should not preclude their reinstatement. This raises the
question as to what should be the legal consequences of a sit-down
strike. That such conduct constitutes a continued trespass seems
clear.' 2  Furthermore, equity may enjoin a sit-down strike and
order the participants to vacate the premises. 13 Force used by
112 Schneider, Workmen's Compensation Law, (2d ed. 1932) sec. 554.
12Restatement of the Law of Torts, section 158.
"3Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, (C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1937) 90 F. (2d) 155.
When this case reached the Supreme Court, the District Court was ordered
to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the cause was moot. Leader v.
Hosiery Co., (1937) 302 U. S. 656, 58 Sup. Ct. 140.
The circuit court of appeals in the Apex Hosiery case based its juris-
diction on the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, holding the sit-down strike a
conspiracy in restraint of interstate commerce. The sit-down strike, how-
ever, was regarded as illegal per se as shown by the following passage from
the opinion: ". . . The defendants in effect argue that the purpose of the
conspiracy here was not aimed at interstate commerce but at the plaintiff,
to compel it to yield to their demand for a closed shop and check-off;
that however unlawful their acts were, they were incidental, only a means
to an end, and do not constitute a conspiracy in restraint of interstate
commerce.
"This argument overlooks the fact that a strike if lawfully conducted is
in itself lawful and its lawfulness now has statutory recognition. There
could be no conspiracy under the Sherman Act or otherwise because of
doing a lawful thing. It could not become a conspiracy unless the means
employed were unlawful." (90 F. (2d) 160).
See also Bryan, Injunctions Against Boycotts and Similar ,Unlawful
Acts, 40 Am. Law Rev. 196, 206, where he says: "Granted that the act(Sherman Act) does apply to consolidated labor as well as to consolidated
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the strikers to keep the employer from his premises is not priv-
ileged, and constitutes a breach of the peace or a criminal assault.
All of these propositions grow out of the concept of private prop-
erty developed by courts of law and equity as the result of long
experience. Of course, if a revolutionary view with respect to
private property were adopted, if the law of trespass were denied,
and if the protection of interests in private property set forth in
the various constitutions of our land were set aside, then it
might be said that a sit-down strike is legal. It seems that the
board did not insist on the reinstatement on the ground that the
strike was a legal act, but rather on the ground that the unlawful
conduct did not terminate the employer-employee relationship.
But even though the Act might seem to indicate a continuance
of the employer-employee relationship, there is still a sufficient
ground why the court should set aside the reinstatement order.
There are many instances in the law where courts have denied
relief on the ground of public policy. Courts have refused to
enforce agreements in restraint of trade, even where the com-
plainant would not be subject to a civil action or any penalty
provided by law. The maxim of clean hands in equity is ap-
plicable here. 4 Courts are constantly deciding cases on the basis
of what they regard as public policy. Sometimes a penal statute
declares the policy that is observed in a case in tort or contract.
The doctrine of clean hands or public policy as here considered
means the court in its interpretation gives effect to an implied
exception in the statute. The Sherman Law made every com-
bination in restraint of trade illegal. This was construed to mean
every unreasonable restraint. Many situations that may later
appear to be covered by the provisions of a statute cannot be
anticipated when it is adopted. The court interprets a statute by
deciding what it means with respect to the facts in the particular
capital, it cannot abridge the right of the men to combine and quit work
for lawful purposes, or to do other lawful acts, even though by them
interstate commerce is crippled . . . the courts unite in disclaiming any
power under this or any other law to interfere with legal and peaceful
strikes."
14It appears that the board in making its order for reinstatement took
the position that the Fansteel Corporation did not defend with clean hands.
This is rather an unusual application of this doctrine. (McClintock, Equity(1936) section 24). If it is said that the board and not the Union is the
party plaintiff under the procedure of the Labor Act, it supports the
criticism of the onesided nature of the obligations the Act imposes. If the
board is regarded as the complaining party, it places a government agency
in the position of condoning a sit-down strike. See Fansteel Metallurgical
Corporation et al., 5 N. L. R. B. No. 124. C. C. H. Labor Service, para-
graph 21, 760.
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case. The court in the Fansteel Case interprets the Labor Act
to mean that employees may engage in such unlawful activity not
mentioned in the Act as to disqualify themselves for reinstatement.
The final decision on this question is one of law for the court,
and not a matter of administrative discretion. The court said it
was forced to its conclusion to avoid placing its approval on a
sit-down strike. This in itself appears to be a sufficient ground
for the decision.
It may be objected that public policy is too uncertain a ground
to be set up as a reason for a decision. It has been characterized
as an unruly horse for the courts to ride. Nevertheless, public
policy has been the basis for the formulation of principles of the
common law as well as the guide in the interpretation of statutes.
Furthermore, the social implications of a sit-down strike are
being considered here as a ground for the court's decision as dis-
tinguished from the more strictly legal considerations set out
above.
After the sit-down strike at Akron, Ohio, in 1936. there ap-
peared an epidemic of disorders in connection with sit-downs in
several parts of the country. Probably the most publicized were
the strikes in the automobile industry in Michigan. A flood of
comment broke forth in the newspapers and magazines. Some
of this tended to condone the sit-down strike as a legitimate weapon
in the hands of labor. Much of the comment was strongly opposed
to this revolutionary method of procedure. The Nation in March
of 19371" in an editorial spoke as follows:
"Whoever you are-judge, corporation head, newspaper pub-
lisher-vou must recognize that the stake these workers have in
their livelihoods and the stake the nation has in healthy and
decent industrial conditions are far greater than your narrow and
static legalism. You cannot chase those men out as you would
chase out a trespasser from your back yard."
In the same month an editorial in Collier's said :10.
"If a cook or a store clerk or a farm laborer should attempt
a sit-down strike, his or her employer would call the police or
the sheriff, and somebody would be quickly arrested for trespass.
The trespasser would be tried and, if the judge felt well that day,
would be put under bond to behave himself. Some confused
leaders. however, have adopted the idea that trespass and violence
are sound union strategy. So they imported the recent French
invention-the sit-down strike. They forget that the French
radicals who advertised this strike were actually revolutionists.
15(937) 144 The Nation, March 27, p. 340.
"1 (1937) 99 Collier's, March 6, p. 70.
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They seized their employer's property and would have retained
it if they could. . . . Actually the sit-down strike is a serious
menace to labor organization. Certainly no one familiar with the
history of unions in this country can see anything but disaster to
labor in this new method .... Neither on moral, legal or practical
grounds can the lawlessness of the sit-down strike be defended.
A prudent regard for their own future will lead the responsible
leaders of labor to abandon this suicidal strategy without hesi-
tation or delay.... Meanwhile, unless we want to invite reaction,
state and city officials will not waste time hesitating to enforce the
law. In the long run, law impartially administered is the only
defense of a free and democratic people."
The following is from The Nation, April, 1937 :17
"We believe that the American people will come to accept the
sit-down with limitations, as a legitimate technique, just as we
expressed last week that American law would eventually sanc-
tion it."
In March, 1937, this expression of view is found in The New
Republic :18
"Despite the hysteria of the daily press, the American labor
situation has not changed in its fundamental aspects. The sit-down
is an immensely effective form of strike and is undoubtedly here
to stay."
In the same issue of The New Republic in a somewhat apologetic
tone is the following :19
"It is also wrong to suppose that responsibility for the sit-
downers rests with the C.I.O., or even with unions in general.
Of the several hundred sit-down strikes in the past few weeks,
many have occurred spontaneously among unorganized workers,
and many more in unaffiliated unions or those owing allegiance
to the A. F. of L. It is a well known fact that even in C.I.O.
groups such as the automobile workers, it was the rank and file
who themselves adopted the sit-down technique, and the leaders
had to accept a fait accompli."
In The New Republic for March 24, 1937, Dean Leon Green
sums up the case for the sit-down strike as follows :20
"This in brief is the case for the sit-down strike. It rests
upon four fundamental propositions:
1. Employees have an interest in the industrial relation dis-
tinct from any property interest or interest of personality. Such
interest is a valuable one of the same dignity as that of property
and is given the recognition and protection of the courts as
property.
17(1937) 144 The Nation, April 3, p. 369.
18(1937) 90 The New Republic, March 31, p. 225.
U.Idem.
20Green, The Case for the Sit-Down Strike, (1937) 90 The New Re-
public, March 24, p. 199.
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2. Disputes between employers and employees with respect to
industrial relations involve economic and political questions out-
side the jurisdictions of the courts; the problems involved are
of such great difficulty, administratively that courts will not under-
take to adjudicate them but will leave them to other agencies of
government and to the parties themselves in absence of such
agencies.
3. Courts will not prejudice the issues between industrial em-
ployers and employees by assuming jurisdiction of issues incidental
to the main dispute in absence of physical violence or fraud direct-
ed against the persons or property of the parties.
4. Occupation in good faith and peacefully of a plant devoted
to industry by employees awaiting the adjustment of differences
growing out of the industrial relation is but an incident of the
industrial relation and in no sense unlawful."
In April, 1937, the Literary Digest21 published a statement
by William Green, President of the American Federation of
Labor, as follows:
"Both personally and officially I disavow the sit-down strike
as a part of the economic and organization policy of the American
Federation of Labor. . . . Public opinion will not long support
sit-down strikes. That means labor loses public support when
any part of it engages in sit-down strikes."
In the same month The Review of Reviews quoted Secretary
of Commerce Roper in an unofficial pronouncement, as follows :22
"Any sit-down strike that undertakes to take over private
property is a serious and fundamental thing and, in my opinion,
would not be endured by the courts."
Honorable Ernest La Pointe in answer to a question raised
by a member of the House of Commons at Ottawa said :23
"A sit-down strike in Canada would be entirely illegal and
would not only tend to undermine all respect for law and order
but would, if proceeded with on any large scale, likely disrupt
the business and administration of the country.
"Such a sit-down strike would also likely, tend to create a
riot and public disorder, which is contrary to the views of or-
ganized labor in this country. Legitimate means of redressing
grievances already exist in Canada.
"The sit-down strike shall not be permitted to obtain any
footing here. The administration of justice is, of course, com-
mitted to the provincial authorities and they are exclusively re-
sponsible for it, but the Dominion Government is prepared to
utilize all the resources and agencies at its command to the end
"1(1937) 123 Literary Digest, April 3, p. 5.
-;*(1937) 95 Review of Reviews, April, p. 14.
-*Quoted from (1937) 95 Review of Reviews, May, p. 11.
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of restraining and eliminating this illegal mode of procedure in
Canada."
In the July, 1937, number of Fortune, the result of a survey
on the sit-down strike situation is given. In the comment on the
tables showing the results obtained is the following :24
"Evidently, then, William Green was conspicuously right when
he declared that public opinion will not support the sit-down strike.
He might have gone further and made the more sensational state-
ment that factory workers themselves oppose sit-down strikes
and still been correct, for here are 59 per cent of them, agreeing
with the executives that sit-down strikes should be stopped and
only 6.2 per cent who propose that labor should use them whether
they are legal or not."
Finally as an expression of public opinion is offered the fol-
lowing from the Congressional Digest :25
"On April 8, 1937, both the Senate and the House passed
S. Con. Res. 7, offered by Senator Key Pittman, Democrat, of
Nevada, the text of which reads:
"'Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives con-
curring), that the so-called sit-down strike is illegal and contrary
to sound public policy;
" 'That the so-called industrial spy system breeds fear, sus-
picion, and animosity, tends to cause strikes and industrial war-
fare, and is contrary to sound public policy; and
"'That it is likewise contrary to sound public policy for any
employer to deny the right of collective bargaining, to foster the
company union, or to engage in any other unfair labor practice as
defined in the National Labor Relations Act.'"
Of course, this concurrent resolution had no force as law.
The unfair practices on the part of employers as set out in the
last two paragraphs were already embodied as law in the National
Labor Relations Act. The only significance of the resolution,
therefore, was to express the belief of the Congressmen as re-
flecting the sentiments of their constituents that sit-down strikes
are illegal. It may be noted that some states have made the sit-
down strike illegal-by statute.
26
Considering the Fansteel Case then, from the standpoint of
public policy and especially in view of the concurrent resolution
of Congress, can it be said that the court was not justified in
24(1937) Fortune, July, p. 98.
See also 16 Cong. Dig. 151 (1937) for an article by Dr. George Gallup
on a nation-wide poll on sit-down strikes. The poll indicated strong popular
feeling against such strikes.
2516 Congressional Digest, May, 1937, p. 143.26Mass., Acts and Resolves 1937, ch. 436. sec. SA: Tenn. Public Acts
1937, ch. 160; Vermont, Laws 1937, ch. 210; see C. C. H. Labor Service, par.
354.
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refusing reinstatement of the sit-down strikers? It would appear
that there was ample ground in public policy to support the court's
statement, \Ve are convinced that petitioner was warranted in
discharging the employees, and we are compelled to so hold in
order to avoid placing our approval upon such activities as they
engaged in."
just a word further with respect to the function of courts
in labor disputes. While much of the litigation may be handled
by administrative bodies, still the interpretation of the statute
creating the administrative agency as well as the definition of its
powers and the limitation of its jurisdiction are questions for the
court to decide. During the years when injunctions were issued
in great numbers to restrain the activities of labor, the criticism
of the labor leaders was that a government of men had displaced
a government of laws. Now it is suggested by some who profess
to be friends of labor that the whole controversy be taken away
from the courts. This would in a large measure inaugurate the
system that labor complained of under the rule by injunction.
The courts are independent of the executive branch of the govern-
ment, and coordinate with it in power. In practice, administrative
bodies are likely to be more influenced by the executive branch.
The personnel of these boards changes to some extent with a
change of administration. It should be remembered that the de-
cisions of the labor board as it sometime in the future may be
constituted may not be acceptable to organized labor. In that
case labor would welcome the right to have the protective features
of the law upheld in the courts. It appears that already one fac-
tion of labor has criticized some of the board's findings." In the
long run labor will profit more under a rule of law than a govern-
ment of men.
2 See The New York Times, Feb. 12, 1938, p. 4.
